distributed ledger technologies, blockchain and cryptocurrencies

a (largely incomplete) timeline

- 1999: first popular p2p service (Napster)
- 2008: Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
- 2010: first real transaction
 - 2 pizzas for 10K BTC
- 2011: "Altcoins" begin to appear
 - Namecoin, Litecoin, etc.
- 2014: UK treasury commissioned a study on cryptocurrencies
- 2015: Ethereum: supporting smart contracts
- 2017:
 - BTC quotation about 16K\$
 - Russia and Estonia announce plans for government backed cryptocurrency
 - blockchain (DLT) and cyrptocurrencies regarded as game-changers
- 2019:
 - BTC quotation 7K\$
 - DLTs mainly regarded as a decentralized applicative platform
 - many pilot projects, a few real applications

Bitcoin, blockchain and DLT

- Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency...
- ...based on a technology called blockchain
- a number of variation of the blockchain are possible and many are used
- they collectively are called Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT)

a DLT solves one fundamental problem

- many subjects need to agree on transactions...
- ...without trusting each other
- transactions are recorded on a ledger
- the ledger is replicated
 - each participant has a copy of it
- consensus on what is a "good copy" of the ledger is reached in a distributed manner
 - no central authority to be trusted

DLT for a cryptocurrency

- transactions are payments
- the ledger records payments
- a "good copy" conforms to plain accounting rules, e.g....
 - no double spending of money
 - controlled money creation
 - no charge back
 - conditions to unlock funds
 - ...and many other technical rules
 - e.g. format of the records

ledgers and security

- a ledger is used by a community of subjects (or parties to transactions)
- it is updated for each transaction
- requirements
 - parties to a transaction need guarantees
 about recording and consensus
 - old transactions must be immutable
 - all involved nodes see and agree on a single ledger status at a certain instant
 - ...that conforms to all consensus rules
- DLTs fulfill these requirements without centralized trusted authority

potential applications of DLT

- real estate registry
- companies registry
- parcels delivery tracking
- civil registry
- financial transactions
- insurance
- medical records
- trial records
- ...

many have legal implications

(un)permissioned DLT

- unpermissioned DLT
 - anybody can contribute (with a new node) to run the DLT
 - large networks
 - slow
 - e.g., Bitcoin
- permissioned DLT
 - only authorized/trusted nodes can join
 - small networks
 - fast
 - typically belonging to industry/banking consortiums, but may run "public"

private/public DLT

- private DLT
 - only authorized subjects can access the ledger
 - nodes perform access control
- public DLT
 - any subject access the ledger
 - subjects access the ledger by contacting nodes
 - no access control by nodes

DLT

		Who can run a node?	
		Permissioned	Unpermissioned
Who can access the ledger?	Private	set up by consortia for internal use (e.g. Ripple, inter-bank money transfers)	this is possible from a technical point of view but% unlikely to occur since no community would support a private objective
	Public	set up by consortia or industry association for providing public services (e.g. Sovrin, self sovereign digital identity)	community driven infrastructure to provide a public service (e.g. cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.)

cryptocurrencies elements

- **identifiers** of transaction parties, i.e. *users* (addresses)
- ledger content, format, consistency
 - many technical rules
- p2p protocol to broadcast accepted and pending transactions among nodes over an overlay network
 - nodes ≠ users
- distributed consensus algorithm
 - a way to reach consensus "securely"
- incentives
- money creation and accounting constraints

Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)

- identifiers
- ledger
- p2p protocol
- distr. consensus alg.

incentives

money creation and accounting constraints

permissioned

identifiers

- identification of subjects is done by private/public key pairs
- in unpermissioned DLT, subjects autonomously create private/public key pairs, possibly many of them
 - having many IDs improves confidentiality
- in permissioned DLT, subjects might be all well known to all nodes
 - shared subject directory and strictly regulated access

ledger

- essentially a log of transactions
- addition of transaction occur on a block basis
 - a block contains many transaction
 - transactions should respect certain
 "semantic rules" that are application-specife
 - e.g. for money: no double spending
 - the order of transactions is fundamental!
 - e.g. for money: can't spend before getting money
- most of the machinery of a DLT is about the addition of a block to the ledger


p2p protocol

- nodes discovery
 - what is the first node to connect to?
- node interconnection
- broadcasting
 - new blocks added to the ledger
 - pending transactions
- each new/pending transaction is broadcasted
- when a node intends to add a block to the ledger, the new block is broadcasted

distributed consensus algorithm

- it is a way to accept a new block
- mandate that "all" accept the same block(s)
 - eventually they will have the same view of the ledger
- check for format rules and other rules
 - these are called consensus rules
 - the most important aspect is to state which sequences of transactions can be accepted!
- contrast "byzantine" (malicious) behavior of nodes...
 - ... which might pretend to subvert the rules
 - hard
- many solutions, a few very famous
 - Proof-of-Work for unpermissioned DLTs
 - slow but it scales to high number of nodes
 - Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant for permissioned DLTs
 - fast but feasible only for a small number of nodes
 - Proof-of-Stake mainly for unpermissioned DLTs
 - fast, scales but some security concern

distributed consensus algorithms overview



source: M. Vukolić. The Quest for Scalable Blockchain Fabric: Proof-of-Work vs. BFT Replication. iNetSec 2015 (adapted)

incentive

- needed only for unpermissioned DLT
- anybody can join the DLT with a new node
 - usually, it is better to have a large number of nodes (for higher security and democracy)
- people have to get an advantage to join
 - joining means sharing resources with a community
- the advantage is usually some form of "money" (tokens)
 - that is, even not strictly money-related DLT have their own form of currency that can be exchanged for real money

consensus rules: "money semantic"

- creation
 - mining, premining, minting, etc.
 - tightly related with the incentive problem
- accounting rules
 - no double spending
 - no charge back
 - transaction fees
- unlocking of funds
 - proving ownership (by cryptographic means)
 - possibly complex rules (smart contracts)

consensus rules: general semantic

- the consensus algorithm can enforce very general semantic
- smart contracts
 - the semantic is the correct execution of program in a certain "virtual machine"
 - essentially the DLT user states what are the rules to be enforced


bitcoin

relevant concepts

- addresses
- transactions
 - txin, txout, utxo, fees
- blocks
- blockchain
- proof-of-work

addresses


- created off-line by your wallet software
 - as many as you want
- private/public key pair
- an address is a cryptographic hash of the public key
- ECDSA standard is used
- notable properties:
 - private keys are random numbers
 - the public key are derived from the private one
 - password based wallet with no explicit key storage are possible
 - Hierarchical Deterministic wallets




address derivation details

- this is the most common kind of address
- it is called "pay to public key hash" (p2pkh)

transactions (TXs)



- transactions form a directed acyclic graph
- txout is associated with...
 - an amount
 - espressed in satoshi
 - 1 satoshi = 10^-8 BTC, i.e., about 0.0001\$
 - a destination address
 - actually a script typically checking for the address
 - dest. addresses may or may not belong to the same subject



- a txout can be...
 - spent, i.e. attached to a txin of another transaction
 - unspent, called unspent tx output (utxo), i.e., no txin attached
- currently "existing" bitcoins are those "stored" at utxo
 - and at addresses associated with current utxo
- a txin always spends the whole utxo amount
- partial spending is realized by adding a txout with a "change address"
 - i.e. returning money to addresses that belong to the same subject owning addresses involved in txin

transaction (un)balance and fees

- sum of amounts for txin's should be greater than the sum of amount of txout's
- the difference is the transaction fee
 - it is implicitly specified by the unbalance

$$Fee = \sum TxIn - \sum TxOut \ge 0$$

- the fee goes to the node that succeeds in putting the transaction in the blockchain
- nodes pick transactions with the highest fees!
 - block size is limited to 1MB! (see after)
 - your transaction might never be accepted due to low fee

txid

- a txid is a cryptographic hash of a transaction
- it is "almost" an id
- "almost"?
 - a design mistake
 - security problems was fixed
 - you can safely consider it as an ideal id

transactions: getting money out of a utxo

- txout are ordered
- each txin specifies a txout by...
 - txid (the transaction)
 - the index (i.e., the order) of the txout in that transaction
- each txin provides a cryptographic proof that the tx creator has the private key for the destination address of the txout

getting money out of a utxo: cryptographic proof

- this is like a challenge response protocol
- txin of a transaction tx provides...
 - public key whose hash should match the address in txout
 - signature with private key of a challenge string X derived from tx
- X is a string derived from...
 - tx where signatures are omitted
 - signing the signature is clearly impossible!
 - the destination address contained in referred txout
 - actually a string derived from the script containing the destination address!
 - it is a quite tricky procedure
 - see https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/OP_CHECKSIG

lifecycle of a transaction


- a user u creates a tx locally
 - it computes all signatures proving private key possession
 - the node should know all previous transactions
- u sends tx to any node n
- n send it in broadcast
- the nodes that receives tx check it for its validity (just syntactically)
- all nodes puts tx into a "pool" of pending transactions
- all nodes try to put tx in the blockchain

blockchain

- this is the ledger of bitcoin
- it is made of blocks
- a block contains many of transactions
- blocks are chained in a sort of authenticated singly linked list
 - hence, blocks are strictly ordered and numbered (depth of a block)
- adding a block is...
 - difficult (proof-of-work approach)
 - provides the node with a reward (incentive) of newly created bitcoins and transaction fees

reward (Bitcoin creation)


- each block create a new amount of bitcoin
 - called "coinbase"
- started at 50BTC/block
- halved every 210000 blocks (about 4 years)
 - total number of BTC is limited
- as of Dec 2017 it is 12.5BTC/block (about 200K\$)
- it is represented as a special transaction
 - the first of each block, no txin, only one txout



block content

- payload, i.e., the transactions
 - block size is limited to 1MB
 - nodes pick transactions with the highest fees! your transaction might never be accepted due to low fee
- header
 - timestamp (very roughly approximated)
 - hash of all transactions
 - a root hash of a Merkle hash tree of all transactions in the payload
 - the hash of the header of the previous block of the blockchain
 - a nonce
 - this is the solution of the puzzle for the proof-of-work approach
 - other stuff

block content



courtesy of G. Di Battista and R. Tamassia

consensus

- adding a block requires to solve a cryptographic puzzle (proof-of-work, PoW)
 - by enumeration approach
- in PoW consensus is implicit
 - a node that works for the next block is accepting all previous ones
- forks may happen:
 - two nodes solve the next block at roughly "same time"
 - with two distinct solutions
 - the two block are broadcasted (fork)
 - actually some nodes see only one of them (non instantaneous broadcast), others see both and choose one
 - the two chains might grow independently for a while

fork resolution the longest chain rule

- a node that sees more chains chooses the longest one
 - transactions that are in a discarded block are put in the pending transaction pool again
 - they might not be accepted any more
 - ... and definitely discarded after a timeout
 - depends on the consensus rules and previous transactions
 - possible double spending!
- which chain grows faster is random
- the longest chain has more work done on it
 - in terms of computation performed

transaction confirmation

- confirmed: stored in an immutable block, forever
- PoW does not provide "mathematical guarantee" of confirmation

- a transaction is considered confirmed if it is enough deep in the blockchain!
- "enough" depends on the criticality of the transaction
- usual confirmation depths are 1 to 6

consensus attacks general objectives

- changes to old blocks already accepted by at least some nodes
 - it is about integrity of the blockchain: important for all DLTs
 - might allow chargeback, double spending, and illegitimate change other parameters of the network

DoS: denial of acceptance of certain transactions

consensus attacks and confirmation depth


- changing of a deep block b...
- ...requires the attacker to solve again all blocks above b
- the attacker needs a huge amount of computing power to reach and surpass the legitimate chain

 the more b is deep the more is "confirmed"

consensus attacks: eclipse


- who controls a large number of nodes can isolate a "victim" node
- the victim see a different blockchain where she can get "malicious payments"
- the malicious payment disappear when the attack terminates and legitimate chain is broadcasted
 - chargeback, double spending
- can be detected by observing an anomalously low "hash power"

consensus attacks: eclipse



overlay network where payment is recorded

the victim assume payment was correctly finalized



regular overlay network, that is screened by the malicious one, where no payment is recorded

when malicious nodes go away, the victim connects to the regular overlay network and see no payment

consensus attack: 51% a.k.a. Sybil attack

from "Sybil: The True Story of a Woman Possessed by 16 Separate Personalities" –F. R. Schreiber - 1973

- who controls more than 50% of the computational power can...
 - disconfirm recently confirmed blocks
 - by surpassing with its chain all other forks
 - get 100% of the rewords
 - by keeping adding blocks
- it can also impact certain consensus rules
 - e.g., creating blocks that signal support for certain features that activates over a certain threshold, and "orphaning" nodes that do not

proof-of-work: the puzzle

- find a block whose header hash is below a certain target threshold
 - SHA256(SHA256(Block_Header))<threshold
 - lower is harder
 - difficulty = maxthreshold/threshold
- target threshold is "given"
- a node can search for a solution varying...
 - nonce
 - timestamp (within certain limits)
 - the set of transactions

target threshold adjustment

- the target threshold at a certain instant is fixed for all nodes
 - current target is stored in the last block
- it is adjusted so that time for solving the puzzle is 10 minutes on average
 - the average tx acceptance delay tend to be 5 minutes
- it is a feedback control loop
 - inputs: the time needed for last 2016 blocks and current threshold
 - output: new threshold
- adjustment happen every 2016 blocks
 - two weeks on average
 - only the node that solve the k*2016th block can change it (it is a consensus rule)

maximum theoretical transaction acceptance throughput

- maximum size of the block is 1MB
- minimum useful tx size is 226 bytes
 - tx with p2pkh addresses, two outputs (one for change), one input
- 1 [MB/block] / 226 [B/tx] / 600 [s/block] =

7.32 [tx/s]

current average about 3.5 [tx/s]

bitcoin policy: the block length dilemma

- larger block size
 - lower fees
 - more txs in a block
 - harder to be a miner
 - more bandwidth, more ram, etc.
 - less democracy
 - limited number of miners can easily decide on the future of Bitcoin: easier to agree to change rules, easier to collude to reach 51% computing power
- smaller block size
 - higher fees
 - easier to be a miner
 - more democratic governance

segregated witness (SegWit)

- a soft fork activated on August 24, 2017
- strip signatures from transactions in the block
 - note that signatures are not relevant for replaying the history of the blockchain
 - it is enough to be sure that someone checked them in during consensus
 - they can be outside the block and possibly forgotten
 - similar approach also in other blockchains
- new address format (SegWit address)
 - transaction should get money from new segwit addresses to "weight less"
 - slow adoption
- equivalent to have about 2MB of block size

Simplified Payment Verification

(thin clients or light clients)

- thin clients do not store the whole blockchain
- they store just block headers
 - 80 bytes, about 4MB/year
- when transaction information is needed an untrusted full node is contacted
 - Merkle tree! proof used for integrity check against the root hash stored in the trusted header

the blockchain (scalability) trilemma

first stated by V. Buterin (Ethereum founder)

- desirable properties: decentralization, scalability, security
- trilemma: you cannot fulfill all the three completely

- any DLT is a compromise
 - current unpermissioned DLT: no scalability
 - permissioned DLT: no decentralization
 - plain p2p technologies: no security
- it is not a theorem
 - research is ongoing for the perfect solution!